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The changes in India’s foreign policy since the 1990s have intensified the debate 
about her future status in the international system (Cohen 2001, Mohan 2003). The 
nuclear power capabilities and her quest for a permanent seat in the security 
council reflect India’s great power ambitions (Nayar/Paul 2003, Wagner 2005). 
Besides the ongoing debate about India’s future role (Perkovich 2003) there is a 
widespread consensus to regard India as a regional power or regional hegemon in 
South Asia (Rüland 1994, DeVotta 2003, Mitra 2003). A first look at the map 
reveals the territorial dominance of India in the subcontinent that is further 
underlined by the size of her population, the resources and military capacities 
compared to her neighbors. India’s asymmetry in South Asia is obvious and 
overwhelming. In the late 1990s India represented 74 percent of the population of 
South Asia, 76 percent of the gross national product (GNP) and 64 percent of the 
export trade (Udagera 2001: 29). According to most statistics India seems to be a 
regional power by default.  
The role and importance of regional powers can be analyzed by various 
approaches of international relations. The concept of regional power has its origin 
in the (neo-) realist school of thought. It is based on the assumption that dominant 
economic resources and military capabilities can be equated with the ability of a 
state to influence its neighbors. Neo-realist approaches emphasize the hard power 
capacities of states, especially their military capabilities and economic strength. 
                                                 
1 Christian Wagner is a senior research associate at the German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs, Berlin (e-mail: <christian.wagner@swp-berlin.org>). An earlier 
version of this paper was presented at the 18th Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, 
University of Lund, Sweden as part of the Panel 24: “International Relations and the South 
Asia Security Order” (Conveners: Mohammed Alam, Karsten Frey, and Christian Wagner). 
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Those enable regional powers to influence their neighbors and to protect 
themselves from disagreeable outside interference (Waltz 1979: 191/192). In 
contrast to this, liberal institutional approaches have emphasized soft power aspects 
with cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions as the main 
resources (Nye 1990: 167). Neo-realism and liberal-institutionalism have different 
understandings of the concept of power. Neo-realism emphasises the capacity of 
states to influence others to behave as it wants them to behave whereas the co-
optive power of liberal-institutionalism aims at “getting others to want what you 
want” (ibid.). 
Concepts of hard and soft power can be regarded as two poles on a continuum 
of power. They also imply different ideas, interactions and institutions for foreign 
policy when looking at the fields of politics, security, and economy. Ideally hard 
power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic 
sanctions in order to enforce national interests resulting in confrontational policies 
vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. In contrast to this soft power strategies emphasise 
common political values, peaceful means for conflict management, and economic 
co-operation in order to achieve common solutions.  
A short look at Indo-Pakistan relations between 1998 and 2004 that oscillated 
between rapprochement and war and at India’s South Asia policy during the 1990s 
raises a couple of questions against neo-realist interpretations of India’s regional 
hegemonic ambitions. Could India be regarded as a regional power after the 
nuclear tests of Pakistan in May 1998 which compensated India’s conventional 
military superiority? Could India use its resources to influence developments in the 
neighbouring countries according to her own political aims?  
The paper argues that India’s regional policy is characterised since the 1990s 
by a shift from hard to soft power strategies. The malign hegemon of the 1980s is 
trying to become a benign hegemon in the 1990s. This shift was not caused 
because of altruistic reasons but can be traced back to various factors. First, India’s 
hard power approach of the 1970s and 1980s was not very successful. Second, the 
economic liberalisation after 1991 added another new element into Indian foreign 
policy on the regional as well as on the international level. Finally, India’s 
aspirations for major power status gave the region a new strategic value. In order to 
underline the argument, the paper will look at the ideas, interactions, institutions, 
and images on the bi- and multilateral level that shaped India’s South Asia policy. 
The notion of region is framed by institutions not geography so that the main focus 
will be on India’s neighbours that are members in the South Asian Association for 
Regional Co-operation (SAARC). 
 
 
I D E A S :  T H E  C O N C E P T U A L  B A S I S  O F  
I N D I A ’ S  S O U T H  A S I A  P O L I C Y  
 
For most part of the time there was hardly an explicit concept of regional policy of 
Indian foreign policy makers. Generally three phases and approaches can be 
differentiated: The Nehru period, the Indira-doctrine and the Gujral-doctrine. 
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Although Nehru formulated the concept of the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence it was not automatically used in the relations with the neighbours 
(Maxwell 1970: 78-80). Nehru’s South Asia policy was characterised by a 
differentiated approach that was shaped by India’s bilateral interests and conflicts 
and not necessarily by a regional perspective. Relations with Pakistan were 
dominated by the Kashmir issue, relations with the Himalayan kingdoms were 
overshadowed by India’s China policy, and Indo-Sri Lanka relations were shaped 
by the problems of the Tamil community on the island. The different interests 
resulted in a South Asia policy that was a mix of hard and soft power strategies.  
It was only under Indira Gandhi’s rule that a more coherent concept of regional 
policy was applied. These ideas were never explicitly formulated by her but were 
widely described as Indira- or South Asia doctrine. The main points were that the 
neighbouring countries were regarded as part of India’s national security. Domestic 
conflicts should only be solved with the help of India and not by interference of 
outside powers or international organisations (Hagerty 1991). These ideas laid the 
foundations for India’s military interventions for instance in Sri Lanka in 1971 and 
1987 to 1990 and in the Maldives 1988. In contrast to Nehru Indira’s regional 
policy was shaped much more by hard power strategies than by soft power 
approaches.  
The doctrine of prime minister Gujral reflected the domestic changes especially 
the economic liberalisation after 1991. He introduced the principle of non-
reciprocity, emphasising that India not only had a bigger responsibility but also 
should give more to the smaller neighbours than she would receive (Gujral 1998: 
37-38). South Asia did not figure very prominently in the BJP’s concept of 
extended neighbourhood after 1998 (Singh 2001). The Southern Asia doctrine 
broadened India’s regional ambitions to West-, Central- and Southeast Asia and 
underlined the BJP’s aspirations for India’s future global role. Within the South 
Asian region the BJP followed mainly the policies of its predecessors. Despite her 
hindu-nationalist ideology and the emphasis on national security the BJP did not 
interfere directly in conflicts like in Nepal despite their repercussions on India’s 
domestic security. Even more astonishing was that the BJP accepted an 
interference of outside powers especially the United States in the region that was 
unprecedented before.  
The electoral victory of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under the 
leadership of the Congress Party in 2004 gave the regional dimension again a 
greater importance. In February 2005 foreign secretary Shyam Saran and prime 
minister Manmohan Singh tied up more explicitly to the Gujral doctrine and 
stressed the need for increased economic relations and promoted the idea of 
partnership with the neighbours. They also underlined that the promotion of 
democracy will not be a tool in India’s relations with her neighbours (Mohan 
2005).  
This overview of India’s South Asian concepts is certainly curtailed and 
compressed but shows the fundamental conceptual shifts. In the 1980s domestic 
political crises in the neighbouring countries would have been regarded as a threat 
to India’s security and would have triggered a debate about interference. Although 
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the threats are still existent and affect her domestic security probably more than 
before India seems to be less and less inclined to interfere. Instead of this different 
Indian governments have emphasised inter-governmental co-operation and seem to 
have less problems with the engagement of external powers.  
 
 
I N T E R A C T I O N :  T H E  L I M I T A T I O N S  O F  H A R D  P O WE R  
 
P a k i s t a n   
 
Although Nehru used military power to protect India’s national interests for 
instance in Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Goa there has also been a strong soft power 
component in his regional policy. Despite the fact that India had border problems 
with both Pakistan and China Nehru did not strenghten the military build-up that 
started only after the military defeat of 1962. During the 1950s he fostered bilateral 
negotiations in order to solve the various conflicts and to ease tensions with 
Pakistan. Besides international mediation for bilateral talks on Kashmir, India and 
Pakistan were able to reach bilateral agreements like the Pant-Mirza Agreement in 
1955 that aimed at preventing border incidents and the protection of places of 
worship, the Trade agreement in 1957 and the World Bank sponsored Indus Water 
Treaty in 1960.  
But in spite of these agreements, India’s relations with Pakistan were shaped by 
the four wars (1947/48, 1965, 1971, 1999) of which three were over Kashmir. With 
regard to India’s regional role the war of 1971 is the most interesting case. The 
support for the East Pakistani freedom fighters underlined India’s diplomatic hard 
power strategy that was followed by the military intervention in December 1971 
and the defeat of the Pakistani army. Today it is only a historical question why 
India did not open a full fledged war on the western front in order to solve the 
Kashmir issue militarily. Former Secretary of State and at that time U.S. national 
security advisor Henry Kissinger argued that India has been warned not to engage 
Pakistan in a full-fledged war and sent the “USS Enterprise” in the Gulf of 
Bengal.2 On the other hand former Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Dobrynin made 
clear that Indira Gandhi was not willing to go to war with Pakistan on the Western 
border and had signalled this to the U.S (Dobrynin 1995: 142/143).  
Besides this historical footnote the more interesting point is that India was not 
able to reach a final solution on Kashmir with the Simla treaty. Indira Gandhi 
obviously tried to settle Kashmir by transforming the ceasefire line into an 
international border between both countries. In the end she refrained from these 
proposals because of the reservations made by the Pakistani prime minister Bhutto 
(Mattoo 2001). Both sides agreed on the Line of Control (LoC) and on further 
bilateral negotiations on Kashmir (Ghosh 2002). 1971 and Simla are often referred 
to as the peak of India’s regional dominance. But from a neo-realist point of view, 
these events can also be interpreted differently. If a regional hegemon was not able 
to transform a military victory into a lasting political solution for one of its most 
                                                 
2 See “Kissinger against spread of n-arms”, in: The Hindu, 9 June 1999. 
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central border issues than the assumption of hegemony seems to be doubtful. Simla 
put the Kashmir issue on the back seat instead of solving it.  
The nuclear test of 1974 was a demonstration of India’s great power ambitions 
but also had unintended negative consequences on the regional level. The 
development of Pakistan’s nuclear programme compensated India’s conventional 
military superiority in the long run. Already in 1974, U.S. ambassador Moynihan 
warned Indira Gandhi about such a development: „India has made a huge mistake. 
Here you were the No. 1 hegemonic power in South Asia. Nobody was No. 2 and 
call Pakistan No.3. Now in a decade’s time, some Pakistani general will call you up 
and say I have four nuclear weapons and I want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them 
on you and we will all meet in heaven. And then what will you do?“ (quoted in 
Perkovich 1999: 186). This status was reached in the late 1980s when Pakistan 
passed the nuclear threshold. India’s political failure at Simla and Pakistan’s 
nuclear capabilities had manifold repercussions on the Kashmir issue. After 1987 
the domestic dimension of the Kashmir conflict, i.e. the demand for greater 
autonomy became linked with the international level when Pakistan started to 
support Islamic militant groups in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).  
The Kargil war of 1999 and the crisis of summer 2002 after the attack on the 
Indian Parliament in December 2001 showed again the limitations of India’s 
military and political hard power strategies under the new constellations. Because 
of Pakistan nuclear capabilities India could not extend her military strikes during 
the Kargil war beyond the LoC. Operation Parakram, i.e. India’s attempt to 
increase the international pressure on Pakistan to stop the infiltration of militant 
fighters over the LoC did also not work. The international community was not 
willing to pressure Pakistan too much because the Musharraf government remained 
one of the most important allies of the West in the war on terrorism (Kalyanaraman 
2002).  
But it should not be overlooked that despite these crises even hindu-nationalist 
parties like the BJP never neglected soft power strategies in the relations with 
Pakistan. After the nuclear tests of 1998, aimed primarily at China not at Pakistan, 
the BJP initiated the Lahore process in 1999. India also demanded the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) Status according to WTO standards from Pakistan in 
order to promote economic co-operation between both countries. After Kargil 
prime minister Vajpayee took the initiative for the Agra summit in July 2001 and 
his proposals in Srinagar in April 2003 opened again the road for dialogue. The 
Islamabad statement of January 2004 established a new framework for bilateral 
negotiations that underline India’s soft power approach.  
From a neo-realist perspective it is evident that India was not able to solve its 
problems with Pakistan according to her interests. The conventional military 
superiority was abandoned politically with Simla and militarily with the nuclear 
test of 1974. Despite her dominant resources India was not able to transform the 
military victory of 1971 into a durable solution of the Kashmir issue. The 
limitations of the hard power strategy became also visible in the 1990s when the 
conflict over Kashmir continuted and sparked off bilateral crises like in 1996. 
Therefore it was not astonishing that India strengthened soft power strategies like 
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the demand for closer economic cooperation and proposals for confidence building 
measures. The obvious political rationale was that this would help to put the 
Kashmir issue again on the back burner.  
 
B a n g l a d e s h  a n d  S r i  L a n k a  
 
In contrast to Pakistan on the one hand and the Himalayan kingdoms on the other 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka could be dealt within the same category when discussing 
India’s regional power ambitions. Both countries experienced military 
interventions by India and both shaped parts of their domestic political institutions 
according to the Indian model at least for some time.  
According to realist models of international relations, states have a ‘natural’ 
quest for power and expansion in order to secure their survival. Pakistan’s defeat in 
1971 therefore offered India the opportunity to integrate former East Pakistan into 
her Union. Ideologically this would have strengthened Nehru’s idea of Indian 
secularism vis-à-vis Jinnah’s concept of religious nationalism. Strategically, this 
would have meant free access to the troubled regions in the Northeast which are 
connected with India only by the narrow Siliguri corridor.  
Because of various reasons, India was not willing to include former East 
Pakistan into the Union (Sisson/Rose 1990). Instead of this India favored a close 
co-operation with the new state. Only three months after the military intervention, 
India and Bangladesh signed a treaty on friendship, co-operation and peace (March 
1972) and two trade agreements in March and July 1972. The friendship treaty 
gave India a say in Bangladesh foreign and security policy further strengthening 
India’s dominant role in the region. Like in India, Bangladesh’s first constitution of 
December 1972 rested on the principles of secularism, nationalism and democracy. 
The country also introduced a variant of India’s mixed economy with strong state 
intervention. At the international level, Bangladesh expanded its relations with the 
Soviet Union that was India’s closest ally during that time.  
Ironically, prime minister Mujibur Rahman and the Awami-League (AL) even 
developed similar authoritarian tendencies like the Congress party of Indira Gandhi 
during the first part of the 1970s. Between 1972 and 1975 it therefore seems to be 
appropriate to qualify India as a regional hegemon vis-à-vis Bangladesh. Because 
of the military support for the freedom fight as well as the massive Indian support 
for the reconstruction caused by the civil war and natural disasters the Bangladeshi 
leadership was more than willing to accept India’s dominant role.  
The situation changed rapidly after the military coup of 1975 and the 
assassination of prime minister Mujibur Rahman and most of his family. The new 
military regime under general Zia ur Rahman tried to diminish India’s role by 
extending their links with the Western industrialised countries and China. Although 
Indira Gandhi supported armed groups in their struggle against the generals until 
1977 she could not prevent the internal and external changes of Bangladesh that 
steadily diminished India’s influence (Hossain 1981: 1122). In the following years 
the bilateral relations were shaped by various contentious issues like illegal 
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migration into India or the Farraka dam in West-Bengal that threatened the 
agricultural and industrial development of Bangladesh.  
The transition towards democracy in 1991 eased the bilateral relations with 
India, especially after the AL took power in 1996. In the same year both countries 
signed an agreement on the Farraka dam that reflected the principle of non-
reciprocity of India’s Gujral doctrine. The bilateral relations remained dependent 
on domestic constellations with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) being more 
critical of India than the AL. At present bilateral relations are marred by border 
disputes and clashes between the border security forces, illegal migration and 
heated debates over militant groups seeking shelter in the neighbouring country. 
But looking at the 32 year period between 1972 and 2004 it was only during the 
first three years that India could really be regarded as a hegemonic power in 
Bangladesh. After 1975 successive regimes in Dhaka were able to retain their 
independence so that India was not able to settle bilateral disputes unilaterally.  
In spite of conflicts over maritime boundaries and territorial disputes like the 
Kachchthivu island, the bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka were 
peaceful and cordial for most of the time. The most important contentious issues 
were related to the Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka, first the citizenship status of the 
Indian Tamils in the upcountry and second the quest for greater political autonomy 
for the Sri Lanka Tamil community in the North and East. The removal of 
citizenship and the disenfranchisement of the Indian Tamil community by the 
Ceylonese government in 1948/49 initiated a series of negotiations and agreements 
over their citizenship status in Sri Lanka and a possible repatriation to India. 
Various agreements were signed, starting with the Sirima-Shastri Pact in 1964 but 
the issue lingered on until 1981 when the Indian High Commission in Colombo 
closed its application list for citizenship. It was only with the citizenship acts of the 
UNP government in 1986 and 1988 that the problem was finally solved (Kodikara 
1992: 32-38). Cordial bilateral relations between the leaders and common position 
in international organisations helped to overcome contentious issues. India also 
helped the Sri Lanka government to fight the first JVP rebellion in 1971 by sending 
troops.  
India’s claim for regional hegemony became obvious during the 1980s when 
the civil war between the Sri Lanka government and the separatist Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) escalated into a full-fledged war. Indira Gandhi’s 
rationale for intervening in Sri Lanka were at least twofold. On the domestic level 
Tamils fled from the war to neighbouring South India and Indira Gandhi was 
looking for support from Tamil parties which had established various links to 
militant groups in Sri Lanka. On the international level she was interested in 
preventing any outside interference by great powers in the region (Muni 1993). In 
order to increase the pressure for a compromise and to control the militant groups, 
these were trained by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). In 1985 India 
mediated the talks between Colombo and the LTTE in Thimpu. In 1987 the Indian 
airforce dropped supplies for the Tamil civil population over Jaffna in clear 
violation of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty signalling at the same time that India was 
willing for a stronger intervention. After secret negotiations the Indo-Sri Lanka 
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Peace Accord was signed with the approval of the LTTE which aimed at a political 
solution of the civil war (Wagner 1990).  
After the military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 this was by far the most 
comprehensive attempt of India to assert her claim as regional hegemon. The 
accord had political and military aspects. Politically, it introduced a new 
administrative structure that was incorporated into the Sri Lanka constitution by the 
13th amendment. The new provincial councils system, shaped similar to the states 
in India, should give political and cultural autonomy to the Tamil minority. 
Militarily, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in the North and 
East in order to disarm the Tamil militant groups. It is well-known that the Indian 
approach failed both politically and militarily. After a few weeks the LTTE turned 
its back to the accord. This resulted in a military confrontation between the IPKF 
and the LTTE. The government in Colombo also faced fierce opposition when the 
JVP started a second armed rebellion against the supporters of the accord. After the 
election of president Premadasa in 1989, an opponent of the accord, negotiations 
were started to end the Indian intervention. The last troops of the IPKF left the 
island in March 1990. In May 1991 the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi who 
had ordered the intervention was assassinated in Tamil Nadu by a suicide squad of 
the LTTE.  
The interval between 1983 and 1990/91 can clearly be identified as a period 
when India used hard power strategies to enforce a political solution in the 
neighbouring country. Nearly the whole spectrum of regional hegemony could be 
identified from diplomatic threats to military intervention. Nevertheless, the 
intervention was a political and military failure in which about 1,200 Indian 
soldiers were killed. Despite her overwhelming resources, India failed in her 
attempt to bring a peaceful solution to the island.  
It is nevertheless remarkable that India showed hardly any interest in the Sri 
Lanka civil war during the 1990s although the military confrontation continued, the 
LTTE demand for a separate state was unacceptable for India as well and the LTTE 
was banned and prosecuted for the murder of Rajiv Gandhi. The BJP government 
has always been reluctant for another political interference in the conflict. It had no 
objections against a mediation of Norway starting in spring 2000 and refused the 
request of the Sri Lankan government to evacuate troops from the North.3 In early 
2002 the Indian government rejected the request of the LTTE to locate their chief 
negotiator Anton Balasingham in Chennai. The new focus on economic co-
operation became obvious in the common activities of both countries within the 
SAARC and in the bilateral Free Trade agreement that was signed in 1998.4  
In contrast to this the new UPA government seemed to give the neighbouring 
countries a new attention. The common minimum programme (CMP) of the UPA 
emphasised that a solution for the conflict has to be found within the territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka. The bilateral defence cooperation that started in late 2003 
                                                 
3 See Colombo 'seeks' Indian help to rescue troops, in: The Hindu, 3 May 2000 (accessed 4 
May 2000); DeVotta 2003.  
4 See Muralidharan, S., Towards freer trade, in: Frontline, Vol. 16, No. 02, Jan. 16 - 29, 
1999 (accessed 13 February 1999). 
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was intensified leading to common maritime exercises in December 2004 that were 
obviously targeted against the ‘Sea-Tigers’.  
The growing cooperation was also welcomed by the new Sri Lankan 
government of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) that demanded a 
greater engagement by India into the conflict after the parliamentary elections of 
April 2004. This was a remarkable move first because the JVP that was fought by 
the Indians in 1971 and was a strong opponent of the accord in 1987 was part of 
the government. Secondly, the majority of the new government depended on the 
votes of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) a party of Buddhist monks which have 
always been critical of an Indian interference.  
Sri Lanka is a good example for the new parameters of India’s South Asia 
policy during the 1990s. The political and military interventions that dominated 
bilateral relations throughout the 1980s were replaced by an intergovernmental 
approach that emphasised traditional forms of political and economic co-operation 
on the bilateral and multilateral level. In accordance with the the ideas of the Gujral 
doctrine the economic interdependence was more in favour of the smaller 
neighbour.5 
It seems obvious that India will not agree to a solution in Sri Lanka that will be 
against her interest, but it is noteworthy that there were hardly any clear Indian 
policies in the 1990s on this issue. It remains to be seen in how far the domestic 
political changes in both countries will result in a new policy that will increase 
India’s engagement in Sri Lanka again. On the empirical level a similar trend like 
in Indo-Bangladeshi relations can be observed. Within the overall period of 56 
years of bilateral relations (1948-2004) only seven to eight years can be identified 
where India’s hegemonic ambitions were obvious.  
 
T h e  H i m a l a y a n  K i n g d o m s  
 
India’s ambitions for regional power were most evident in her relations with the 
Himalayan kingdoms. The treaties with Bhutan (August 1949), Nepal (July 1950) 
and Sikkim (December 1950) can easily be classified as a diplomatic hard power 
strategy. In order to secure its interest in the region vis-à-vis China India pursued 
the policy of the colonial rulers by a series of treaties that curtailed the external 
relations of the isolated kingdoms.6 In exchange for non-interference in internal 
affairs India overtook the guiding role in Bhutan’s external relations. The 
monopoly for arms supply further strengthened India’s role in the kingdom. In 
contrast to Bhutan, Sikkim became a protectorate with an Indian representative and 
could not be regarded as an independent state. In 1975 Sikkim was finally merged 
with the Indian Union.  
The most interesting case for India’s hegemonic ambitions are her relations 
with Nepal. Secret by-arrangements which became public only many years later 
                                                 
5 See Kelegama, Saman, Sri Lankan Exports to India. Impact of Free Trade Agreement, in: 
Economic and Political Weekly, 26 July 2003. 
6 The treaties can be found in Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India. Texts of 
Documents 1947-59, New Delhi 1959. 
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restricted Nepal’s foreign relations in favour of India. India also mediated in 
internal power struggles. In 1950/51 Delhi brokered a settlement that brought the 
downfall of the Rana-Dynasty and the return of King Tribhuvan on the throne. 
India also used Nepal’s economic dependence to exert pressure on the government 
especially when the monarchy tried to play the ‘China card’ to dampen India’s 
influence. Probably because of security concerns or because of her reluctance for 
open interference India has always been hesitant to support the process of 
democratic reforms in the country in a consequent manner. This was astonishing 
because many Nepalese opposition leaders found asylum in India and had close 
links to Indian parties. The Indian economic blockade in 1989 when the main 
border posts were closed over the dispute on the trade and transit treaty sparked off 
the movement that led to the overthrow of the monarchy in spring 1991. Although 
individual India politicians were in Kathmandu to support the democratic 
movement it would be too far to assume that it was a fabrication of the Indian 
government.  
The transition towards democracy in 1991 did not necessarily brought an 
improvement in the bilateral relations with India. Because of past experiences the 
new democratic constitution included an article that the parliament must be 
involved in foreign policy issues that deal with natural resources. Like in 
Bangladesh relations with India became part of the domestic discussions in Nepal 
during the 1990s. Again, the Gujral doctrine was helpful to overcome some of 
these disputes. Both countries agreed to the common development of the Mahakali 
river in 1997 that was positively evaluated for Nepal and the new transit treaty 
included better conditions for the Himalayan kingdom (Khanal 1998: 149-150; 
Rose 2000: 191). But there is still a lot of resentment and mistrust against the 
bigger neighbour in the South and India’s proposals for closer economic ties met 
fierce opposition by the Nepalese industry that feared the dominance of Indian 
business.  
In the 1990s India’s relations with Nepal followed a similar pattern like 
towards Sri Lanka. This became most obvious after 1996 when the Maoist 
rebellion shook the foundations of Nepalese democracy. The Maoist movement 
had close links with various militant left wing groups, like People’s War Group 
(PWG) or the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), that were operating in 
neighbouring Indian states. In 2001 Nepal Maoists together with the PWG and the 
MCC formed the Indo-Nepal Border Committee in order to co-ordinate their 
activities.7 In July 2002 the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and 
Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was founded which aimed at the 
creation of a revolutionary corridor from Andhra Pradesh to Nepal. Despite the 
close interlinkages that affect her internal security, India was not willing for a 
greater unilateral intervention in Nepal but restricted her support to delivery of 
arms, intelligence technology and training of the security forces. Like in Sri Lanka 
India was also ready to accept external interference by outside powers like the 
                                                 
7 See Sanjay K. Jha, Left Wing Terror: The MCC in Bihar and Jharkhand, in: South Asia 
Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, Nr. 40, 21. April 2003 (accessed on 27.4.03).  
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United States and Great Britain that also intensified their military support for the 
Nepalese government to fight the Maoist rebellion.  
Comparing the regional scenario at the beginning of the 21st century with the 
situation in the 1980s, the changes in India’s South Asia policy are apparent. The 
Indira doctrine has always propagated to keep external powers out of the region 
that was regarded as part of India’s national security environment. Today, the U.S. 
and other Western powers are supporting the governments of Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
This illustrates the failure of the Indira doctrine and the shift of India’s new 
regional policy which puts a stronger emphasis on soft power aspects like 
economic relations. The changes also include new challenges for India’s regional 
policy. The common interests of India and the Western countries to find durable 
solutions for civil war scenarios like in Nepal and Sri Lanka may open the avenue 
for a more coordinated international action. Such a multilateral approach to deal 
with domestic conflicts in neighbouring countries would certainly be a new 
element in India’s South Asia policy.  
 
 
I N S T I T U T I O N S :  M U L T I L A T E R A L  C O - O P E R A T I O N  
I N  S O U T H  A S I A  
 
The countries of South Asia were confronted from the beginning with similar 
problems of underdevelopment. But because of the bilateral tensions between India 
and Pakistan there were hardly any approaches for a multilateral approach to deal 
with them. The Colombo Plan of 1951 co-ordinated the development assistance for 
various countries of the region but did not become a starting point for regional co-
operation.  
The first initiative for a closer regional co-operation was raised in the late 
1970s by the president of Bangladesh Zia-ur Rahman. Because of the tense Indo-
Bangladeshi relations at that time he aimed at a closer collaboration of the smaller 
countries in South Asia in order to counter the Indian dominance. Despite the 
bilateral tensions the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) 
came into existence in 1985 including both India and Pakistan. Because of 
apprehensions that a regional organisation would be dominated by the other 
country in case of non-membership both countries joined the new organisation. The 
SAARC-charter included the provision that decisions had to be taken unanimously 
and contentious issues were kept out of the organisation. Until the early 1990s the 
progress of SAARC was only modest. The annual summits were the most 
important achievement because they could be regarded as a confidence building 
measure on the highest level in case they were not postponed because of bilateral 
conflicts like between India and Sri Lanka in 1989. Until that time it is important to 
note that SAARC was not dominated by India that did not try to strengthen her 
hegemonic ambitions with the help of a regional organisation. India may have 
prevented SAARC from becoming a forum of the smaller neighbours against her. 
But it is also difficult to imagine how such an anti-India strategy would have 
looked like given the lack of common interests among the smaller neighbours.  
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With the liberalisation in India after 1991 economic co-operation got a new 
momentum within SAARC. Since that time all South Asian countries followed a 
policy of economic reforms, export promotion, and integration into the world 
market. In 1991 a commission was established to look into the prospects of 
regional economic collaboration. The results formed the basis for the SAARC 
Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) that was ratified in 1995 by all 
countries despite the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir at 
that time. Of course, the introduction of SAPTA could not overcome the structural 
constraints of the regional economies, like the lack of complementarity, so that 
intra-regional trade remained only two to three percent. A further improvement of 
intra-regional trade can be expected from the SAARC Free Trade Arrangement 
(SAFTA) that was signed in January 2004 in Islamabad. It aims at the creation of a 
free trade area in South Asia from the beginning of 2006. In order to support the 
economic transformation of less developed economies Bhutan, Bangladesh, and 
Nepal will receive longer periods for the implementation of SAFTA.  
The efforts in promoting economic co-operation in SAARC since the 1990s 
underlined again India’s new regional approach. It seems obvious that the idea of 
the Gujral doctrine was in the background and the maxim of liberal-institutional 
arguments that economic co-operation produce absolute gains for all players. The 
free trade agreement with Sri Lanka of 1998 and the negotiations for similar 
agreements with Nepal and Bangladesh point in the same direction. The new 
Indian activities underline the change of India’s South Asia policy and her shift 
from hard power to soft power strategies.  
 
 
I M A G E S :  F R O M  R E G I O N A L  B U L L Y  
T O  B E N I G N  H E G E M O N Y ?  
 
It has already been mentioned that the neighbouring countries never accepted the 
claim that South Asia was part of India’s national security. They developed various 
strategies to counter India’s ambitions which ranged from military rearmament, as 
in the case of Pakistan, to internationalising bilateral conflicts either by 
international organisations or external powers, as in the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka. It was understandable that the bilateral conflicts created the image 
of India being the regional bully in South Asia. At the same time the bilateral 
tensions superposed common problems of underdevelopment so that confrontation 
rather than co-operation became the main pattern of bilateral relations in the 
region. The outcome was counterproductive for all countries involved. First, the 
lingering conflicts created enormous political and military costs. Secondly, South 
Asia got the image of a region of ‘chronic instability’ over the years. Foreign direct 
investors shunned the region so that the process of economic and social 
modernisation was further delayed. The international social and economic 
indicators and the low ranks of South Asian countries in the Human Development 
Index illustrated this process.  
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Since the 1990s the political systems and economic policies in the region have 
adjusted themselves to international standards. Today there is a common consensus 
among the political elites that democracy and market economic reforms are the best 
strategies to cope with the problems of underdevelopment. The challenge for India 
is that her new regional policy has to counter several phenomena in the 
neighbouring countries. First, the hard power strategies of the 1970s and 1980s 
created a deep seated mistrust towards India’s intentions among the smaller 
neighbours. Secondly, because of the historical experiences, the neighbours tend to 
perceive their relations with India mainly under a foreign and security focus 
whereas political and economic considerations were only of secondary importance. 
Finally, because of her size and economic importance significance, relations with 
India are the central and often most controversial foreign policy issue in all 
neighbouring states. India might have changed her regional policies, but it will 
probably take a much longer time until the perceptions in the neighbouring 
countries will adapt in a similar way.  
 
 
P E R S P E C T I V E S :  F R O M  H A R D  P O W E R  T O  S O F T  P O WE R ?  
 
India seems to be a regional power by default. But a closer look at ideas, 
interactions, institutions, and images reveals a modified picture. There were 
periods when India had the ideas as well as the political will and the capabilities to 
act as a regional hegemon especially during the 1970s and 1980s. The high time 
started in 1971 with the military interventions in Sri Lanka and East Pakistan. It 
ended in March 1990 when the IPKF left Sri Lanka and India’s ambitious plans for 
a conflict resolution had failed. During that period India’s regional power rested on 
her hard power capabilities ranging from diplomatic coercion to economic 
sanctions to military interventions. Soft power strategies like economic co-
operation and the promotion of common political values only played a secondary 
role.  
Despite her dominance, India hegemonic ambitions were not successful. 
Except for the Himalayan kingdoms, India was not in a position to influence either 
the domestic or the foreign policy of her neighbours in the sense she could 
determine the outcome of bilateral conflicts. Measured against India’s self 
proclaimed role as predominant regional power the outcome was only modest, but 
had far-reaching consequences for India by transforming South Asia into a region 
of ‘chronic instability’.  
The changing domestic and international environments, the learning process of 
failures like in Sri Lanka and the political and economic costs involved brought a 
fundamental change in India’s approach towards the region. The Gujral doctrine 
represented a new regional approach that was pursued by successive governments 
irrespective of their political affiliation. It emphasised intergovernmental relations 
instead of political interference, non-reciprocity instead of tit-for-tat, and the 
promotion of common economic interests instead of divergent concepts like 
national security.  
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India’s South Asia policy since the 1990s shows a shift from a hard power 
strategy of military and diplomatic interventions to a soft power approach that 
emphasises inter-governmental co-operation, negotiated settlements and economic 
collaboration. The changes can also be seen as attempt to change India’s image 
from a regional bully to a benign hegemon. The new political imperatives may be a 
first step. The far bigger challenge ahead is that the negative images and 
perceptions in the neighbouring countries where ‘India’ is still a disputed issue will 
also have to undergo a fundamental transformation. It remains to be seen in how 
far India’s ‘positive unilateralism’8 will create a better regional framework or in 
how far the growing outside interference will bring about a shift towards 
multilateralism in India’s regional policy.  
 
                                                 
8 See Mohan, C. Raja, India's positive unilateralism, in: The Hindu, 27. October 2003. 
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